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Commit 6c5e4915 authored by David Woodhouse's avatar David Woodhouse Committed by Greg Kroah-Hartman
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x86/cpufeature: Blacklist SPEC_CTRL/PRED_CMD on early Spectre v2 microcodes



(cherry picked from commit a5b2966364538a0e68c9fa29bc0a3a1651799035)

This doesn't refuse to load the affected microcodes; it just refuses to
use the Spectre v2 mitigation features if they're detected, by clearing
the appropriate feature bits.

The AMD CPUID bits are handled here too, because hypervisors *may* have
been exposing those bits even on Intel chips, for fine-grained control
of what's available.

It is non-trivial to use x86_match_cpu() for this table because that
doesn't handle steppings. And the approach taken in commit bd9240a18
almost made me lose my lunch.

Signed-off-by: default avatarDavid Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: default avatarThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: default avatarGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk
Cc: ak@linux.intel.com
Cc: ashok.raj@intel.com
Cc: dave.hansen@intel.com
Cc: karahmed@amazon.de
Cc: arjan@linux.intel.com
Cc: torvalds@linux-foundation.org
Cc: peterz@infradead.org
Cc: bp@alien8.de
Cc: pbonzini@redhat.com
Cc: tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com
Cc: gregkh@linux-foundation.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1516896855-7642-7-git-send-email-dwmw@amazon.co.uk


Signed-off-by: default avatarDavid Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: default avatarGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
parent a8799fd1
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+5 −2
Original line number Diff line number Diff line
@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@
 */

#define INTEL_FAM6_CORE_YONAH		0x0E

#define INTEL_FAM6_CORE2_MEROM		0x0F
#define INTEL_FAM6_CORE2_MEROM_L	0x16
#define INTEL_FAM6_CORE2_PENRYN		0x17
@@ -21,6 +22,7 @@
#define INTEL_FAM6_NEHALEM_G		0x1F /* Auburndale / Havendale */
#define INTEL_FAM6_NEHALEM_EP		0x1A
#define INTEL_FAM6_NEHALEM_EX		0x2E

#define INTEL_FAM6_WESTMERE		0x25
#define INTEL_FAM6_WESTMERE_EP		0x2C
#define INTEL_FAM6_WESTMERE_EX		0x2F
@@ -36,9 +38,9 @@
#define INTEL_FAM6_HASWELL_GT3E		0x46

#define INTEL_FAM6_BROADWELL_CORE	0x3D
#define INTEL_FAM6_BROADWELL_XEON_D	0x56
#define INTEL_FAM6_BROADWELL_GT3E	0x47
#define INTEL_FAM6_BROADWELL_X		0x4F
#define INTEL_FAM6_BROADWELL_XEON_D	0x56

#define INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE_MOBILE	0x4E
#define INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE_DESKTOP	0x5E
@@ -57,9 +59,10 @@
#define INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_SILVERMONT2	0x4D /* Avaton/Rangely */
#define INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_AIRMONT		0x4C /* CherryTrail / Braswell */
#define INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_MERRIFIELD	0x4A /* Tangier */
#define INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_MOOREFIELD	0x5A /* Annidale */
#define INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_MOOREFIELD	0x5A /* Anniedale */
#define INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_GOLDMONT	0x5C
#define INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_DENVERTON	0x5F /* Goldmont Microserver */
#define INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_GEMINI_LAKE	0x7A

/* Xeon Phi */

+66 −0
Original line number Diff line number Diff line
@@ -61,6 +61,59 @@ void check_mpx_erratum(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
	}
}

/*
 * Early microcode releases for the Spectre v2 mitigation were broken.
 * Information taken from;
 * - https://newsroom.intel.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/11/2018/01/microcode-update-guidance.pdf
 * - https://kb.vmware.com/s/article/52345
 * - Microcode revisions observed in the wild
 * - Release note from 20180108 microcode release
 */
struct sku_microcode {
	u8 model;
	u8 stepping;
	u32 microcode;
};
static const struct sku_microcode spectre_bad_microcodes[] = {
	{ INTEL_FAM6_KABYLAKE_DESKTOP,	0x0B,	0x84 },
	{ INTEL_FAM6_KABYLAKE_DESKTOP,	0x0A,	0x84 },
	{ INTEL_FAM6_KABYLAKE_DESKTOP,	0x09,	0x84 },
	{ INTEL_FAM6_KABYLAKE_MOBILE,	0x0A,	0x84 },
	{ INTEL_FAM6_KABYLAKE_MOBILE,	0x09,	0x84 },
	{ INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE_X,		0x03,	0x0100013e },
	{ INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE_X,		0x04,	0x0200003c },
	{ INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE_MOBILE,	0x03,	0xc2 },
	{ INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE_DESKTOP,	0x03,	0xc2 },
	{ INTEL_FAM6_BROADWELL_CORE,	0x04,	0x28 },
	{ INTEL_FAM6_BROADWELL_GT3E,	0x01,	0x1b },
	{ INTEL_FAM6_BROADWELL_XEON_D,	0x02,	0x14 },
	{ INTEL_FAM6_BROADWELL_XEON_D,	0x03,	0x07000011 },
	{ INTEL_FAM6_BROADWELL_X,	0x01,	0x0b000025 },
	{ INTEL_FAM6_HASWELL_ULT,	0x01,	0x21 },
	{ INTEL_FAM6_HASWELL_GT3E,	0x01,	0x18 },
	{ INTEL_FAM6_HASWELL_CORE,	0x03,	0x23 },
	{ INTEL_FAM6_HASWELL_X,		0x02,	0x3b },
	{ INTEL_FAM6_HASWELL_X,		0x04,	0x10 },
	{ INTEL_FAM6_IVYBRIDGE_X,	0x04,	0x42a },
	/* Updated in the 20180108 release; blacklist until we know otherwise */
	{ INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_GEMINI_LAKE,	0x01,	0x22 },
	/* Observed in the wild */
	{ INTEL_FAM6_SANDYBRIDGE_X,	0x06,	0x61b },
	{ INTEL_FAM6_SANDYBRIDGE_X,	0x07,	0x712 },
};

static bool bad_spectre_microcode(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
{
	int i;

	for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(spectre_bad_microcodes); i++) {
		if (c->x86_model == spectre_bad_microcodes[i].model &&
		    c->x86_mask == spectre_bad_microcodes[i].stepping)
			return (c->microcode <= spectre_bad_microcodes[i].microcode);
	}
	return false;
}

static void early_init_intel(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
{
	u64 misc_enable;
@@ -87,6 +140,19 @@ static void early_init_intel(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
		rdmsr(MSR_IA32_UCODE_REV, lower_word, c->microcode);
	}

	if ((cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL) ||
	     cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_STIBP) ||
	     cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_AMD_SPEC_CTRL) ||
	     cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_AMD_PRED_CMD) ||
	     cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_AMD_STIBP)) && bad_spectre_microcode(c)) {
		pr_warn("Intel Spectre v2 broken microcode detected; disabling SPEC_CTRL\n");
		clear_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL);
		clear_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_STIBP);
		clear_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_AMD_SPEC_CTRL);
		clear_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_AMD_PRED_CMD);
		clear_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_AMD_STIBP);
	}

	/*
	 * Atom erratum AAE44/AAF40/AAG38/AAH41:
	 *